Dış Kaynaklı Proje Süreçleri Yönetim Sistemi
At least since the end of Cold War but particularly after 2001, the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and their implementation have gradually become part and parcel of everyday practice of international law. Recent times have witnessed sophistication of sanctions regimes established by UNSC resolutions and expansion of the fields in relation to which such regimes are provided for. In addressing international crises, international terrorist acts and activities of transnational criminal networks on a case-by-case basis, and upon recommendations by sanctions (counter-terrorism) committees and other bodies, sanction regimes have evolved into more complicated mechanisms to encompass a wide array of fields, for both individuals and entities. In this vein, an evolving and complex security architecture has been built by sanctions committees and relevant bodies, at different levels, i.e., whether national, supranational, transnational or international. The outlined trend is interesting for a couple of reasons. Simply put, throughout the Cold War the UN sanctions, particularly embargo, had been imposed on states without too much effectiveness. In post-1989 era, in turn, sanctions were employed more frequently and more rigorously. Since late 1990s, sanctions have gradually (i) targeted individuals instead of communities, (ii) purported to achieve policy goals, and (iii) diversified but towards more effective implementation, such as establishment of sanctions committees to identify transgressors and to oversee structural problems. Around the turn of the century, more concretely, for instance, the goal of achieving effectiveness has culminated in global sanctions list that comprises individuals identified as violators of sanctions regimes. Within UN-setting and in a globalized world, UNSC committees have played a key role in the evolution of such regimes by framing, development and implementation of ‘targeted’, ‘smart’ sanctions. In this perspective, sanctions regimes in general, global sanctions list in particular have thus contributed significantly to countering international terrorism for maintenance of peace in response to crises.
Based on the above, threats, attacks and damage to, or destruction of cultural heritage, and trafficking in cultural property in terms of terrorism finance have been incorporated into the UNSC sanctions regime as well. By UNSC Resolutions 1483 (2003), 2199 (2015) and 2347 (2017), among others, securitization of culture was finally achieved –albeit with structural shortcomings and at least only on paper– in response to threats, attacks, damage, or destruction mentioned above (see, e.g., Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Arm. v. Azer.), Order (Dec. 7, 2021) (Yusuf, J., dissenting)) and with particular reference to international terrorism and activities of non-state armed groups (NSAGs), e.g., Al-Qaida (QDe.004) or Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). For several reasons, there is relatively little practice of UN counter-terrorism committees –particularly 1267/1989/2253 Committee, Counter Terrorism (1373) Committee or Mali (2374) Committee– regarding acts against cultural property or cultural heritage. However, though limited in number, patterns of justifications for NSAG and NSAG-related individual listing are already discernable. The above state of affairs is also particularly significant in the context of their cumulative effect on, ad minimum, both (i) relevant framework of international organizations, e.g., UNESCO, INTERPOL, UNODC, World Customs Organization, and (ii) national jurisdictions and legal systems, often penetrated by regional organizations’ framework, in particular, the EU. Against the backdrop of international cultural heritage law (ICHL) or art law (AL), which is underlined by the tension between prohibition of certain activities designed to prevent harm to cultural objects, including but not limited to property/heritage and regulating the art market, the problem with the ICHL framework is creation and gradual enlargement of the ‘gap’ between, or ‘the lack of intersection among the treaties that address wartime circumstances’, and ‘those that address peacetime movement and the functioning of the international art market of cultural objects’, e.g., 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (2421 U.N.T.S. 457 (1995)) (Patty Gerstenblith, The Disposition of Movable Cultural Heritage, in INTERSECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW 7, 19 (A.-M. Carstens & E. Varner eds. 2020)).
In the above-mentioned context, the intervention of UNSC through UN counter-terrorism committees and individual sanctions, and its effects on the framework of UNIDROIT’S work areas, instruments and projects –at least since 2017– pertinent both to follow-up on the 1995 Convention and private art collections with particular focus in the AL framework, e.g., defining private art collections, requirements of due diligence, provenance for private art collections require further study and analysis (see, e.g., UNIDROIT 2017 C.D. (96) 15, ¶¶ 9, 126, 129; or more recently, UNIDROIT 2022 C.D. (101) 21, ¶ 255). For that purpose, careful study and analysis of UNSC security architecture, the research summary above would provide a useful background to assess pertinence of UNSC security architecture on the art market in general, and consequences thereof to national laws, and to individuals and collections which are subjected to the latter. Further, based on relevant literature and practice, it will also promote, locate, and contribute to appreciation of the UNIDROIT’s previous and current work on ICHL/AL frameworks and relevant projects, e.g. UCAP. Still, additionally, it will both build upon the majestic work of –and in a way, humbly, supplement– Prof. Elina Moustaira, ART COLLECTIONS, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDY (Springer 2015) (see also Jorge Sánchez Cordero, 20 UNIF. L. REV. 617, 618-19 (2015)).